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IMPACT OF RICO UPON LABOR UNIONS
ROBERT M. TWISs*
T HIS PAPER will examine Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970,1 relating to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO). It will then discuss how Title IX pertains to labor unions and
whether the assets of a labor organization may be forfeited under the civil
forfeiture provisions of the Act.2
THE STATUTE
Approximately one decade ago, Congress passed a number of acts
designed to strengthen federal efforts in combatting crime. Among these
enactments were the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,1 the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970' and the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.'
Following hearings in 1970, Congress found that:
(1) organized crime in the United States was a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and
illegal use of force, fraud and corruption;
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling,
loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation
and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs and
other forms of social exploitation;
(3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate businesses and labor unions and to subvert and
corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability
of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously
burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic
security and undermine the general welfare of the nation and
its citizens; and
*Appellate Defense Counsel, United States Army, Washington, D.C.; B.A., University of
Massachusetts, 1970, M.A. Wichita State University, 1979; J.D., University of San Francisco,
1975; LL.M. Candidate, Georgetown University. The views and opinions expressed herein
are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States
Army, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.
I Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
3 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5,18,28,42,47 U.S.C.).
' Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18,42 U.S.C.).
5Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
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(5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evi-
dence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of
the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and
other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the government are unnecessarily limited
in scope and impact.'
The stated purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strength-
ening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."'
The Act provides for the empanelling of a special grand jury at the re-
quest of the Attorney General,8 immunity to witnesses who refuse to testify
on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, 9 summary confine-
ment of witnesses for refusing to testify before a court or grand jury of the
United States,1" additional sanctions for false declarations before a grand jury
or court,' protected facilities for housing government witnesses,"2 depositions
to preserve testimony,' limitations on litigation concerning sources of evi-
dence," prohibitions against syndicated gambling," increased sentences for
dangerous special offenders,'" regulation of explosives," and establishment
of a commission to review national policy toward gambling."'
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act, entitled "Racketeer In-
fluenced and Controlled Organizations,"' " contains a three-fold standard:
(1) making unlawful the receipt or use of income from "racketeering
activity" or its proceeds by a principal in commission of an ac-
tivity to acquire an interest in or establish an enterprise engaged
in interstate commerce;
'Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922-23.
'Id.
6 18 U.S.C. § 3331-3334 (1976).
9 Id. §§ 6001-6005.
1028 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976).
12 Pub. L. No. 91-452, title V, §§ 501-504, 84 Stat. 933-34 (included in the code as a note
preceding 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1979)).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976).
24 Id. § 3504.
15 ld. § 1511, 1955.
'Old. § 3575-3578.
IT Id. § 841-848.
I8 Pub. L No. 91-452, title VIII, H3 804-808, 84 Stat. 938-40 (noted after 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1976)).
19 Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 1095-1104 (codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
[VoL 14:1
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(2) prohibiting the acquisition of any enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce through a "pattern" of "racketeering activity" and
(3) proscribing the operating of any enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce through a "pattern" of "racketeering activity."2
Under the Act, it is
unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a prin-
cipal . . . to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . . in
acqusition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce."
It is "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain . . . any in-
terest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."22 It is "unlawful for any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."23 It is also unlawful
to conspire to violate any of the above. "
A "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as requiring "at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of confinement) after the commissison of a prior act
of racketeering activity."2 A "racketeering activity" is defined as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, ar-
son, robbery, bribery, extortion or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under state law and pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act indictable under any of the following provisions of Title
19, United States Code: [the list includes code sections relating to
bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipment, embezzle-
ment from pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit trans-
actions, transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire
fraud, obstruction of justice, interference with commerce, robbery,
extortion, interstate transportation of wagering paraphenalia, un-
20 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4007-10.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
221d. § 1962(b).
281d. § 1962(c).
-1Id. § 1962(d).
251d. § 1961(5).
Summer, 1980]
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lawful welfare fund payments, interstate transportation of stolen
property, contraband cigarettes and white slave traffic];
(C) any act which is indictable under Title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
labor organizations) or Section 501 (c) (relating to embezzlement
from union funds); or
(D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States.2"
For purposes of RICO, a "'person' includes any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property"2 and an "'enter-
prise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals asssociated in fact
although not a legal entity."2
Whoever violates the Act is subject to a fine of $25,000 and imprison-
ment for twenty years. 9 In addition, any person convicted of violating the
Act forfeits any interest acquired or maintained in violation of the
Act' and "any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or con-
tractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enter-
prise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of Section 1962." 3'
Civil remedies to prevent violation of the Act or to recover damages
for its violation are available. The United States district courts "have juris-
diction to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act
by issuing appropriate orders, including but not limited to: ordering
any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including prohibiting any person from en-
gaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise....
The Attorney General may institute proceedings, 2 and any person who
2e d § 1961(1).
27 Id. § 1961(3).
28 Id. § 1961(4).
291d. § 1963(a).
30d. § 1963(a)(1).
1Id. § 1963(a)(2).
21d. § 1964(a).
3d. § 1964(b).
[Vol. 14:1
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suffers injury to his business or property because of a violation of the
Act may sue for treble damages plus costs and attorney's fees. 3
"Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any per-
son or enterprise may be in possession, custody or control of any docu-
mentary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation, he may . . . is-
sue a civil investigative demand for the production of the documents.""5
If the recipient of such a civil demand fails to comply, the Attorney General
can seek enforcement in the appropriate federal district court.3"
It has been noted that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions statute "does not make illegal any specific action which was previously
legal, since all acts punishable under RICO are also punishable under
either state or federal statutes."3 RICO does provide, however, that a person
who commits two of the listed offenses is guilty of a "pattern of racketeering
activity" and therefore subject to penalties beyond those of the individual
listed offenses. The RICO statute, by adding the additional concept of "en-
terprise" to a criminal prosecution, requires proof of a relationship between
the acts that constitute the pattern and that enterprise.3 8 The statute is de-
signed to "meet the variety of crimes utilized by organized criminals who
invest in, acquire, infiltrate and use illegitimate organizations."'"
Unlike most criminal legislation, RICO was expressly intended to "be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.""' Thus judges are
instructed not to apply the traditional judicial cannon that penal statutes
should be narrowly construed with any ambiguity being resolved in favor
of the accused."
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF "ENTERPRISE"
A significant amount of litigation has surrounded RICO since it was
passed in 1970. Most of it has revolved around the meaning of "enterprise"
as used in the Act. There has been disagreement among the United
States courts of appeals on that question. Since the Act was designed to
combat crime, it would be logical to assume that the persons intended to
be prosecuted thereunder are the types of organized crime figures known at
the time the Act was passed. Further, since Congress intended to inhibit
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime figures, it would
4id. § 1964(c).
351d. § 1968(a).
80ld. § 1968(g).
87Blakely and Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM.
Cumh. L. REv. 341, 348 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Blakely).
88Id.
39 Id. at 349.
4oPub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (noted after 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976)).
41 Blakely, supra note 37, at 349.
Summner, 1980]
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be logical to assume that the "enterprises" involved in the litigation would
be legitimate businesses. Neither assumption, however, has proven valid.
Instead, a much broader reading has been given to the statute by the courts.
In the United States v. Aleman,4 2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the notion that a defendant under RICO must be an organized
crime figure:
The prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) apply to "any person"
or "any enterprise." Although the stated purpose of the Organized
Crime Act, of which RICO is a part, is to eradicate organized crime,
the statute itself does not require proof that the defendant or the enter-
prise are connected with organized crime.
No circuit has held that a defendant must be identified with the popular
conception of organized crime in order to be subject to prosecution." The
statute itself includes within the definition of "person" any entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 5 Accordingly, labor unions,
corporations, trusts and pension plans are among the list of potential
defendants.
Not so easily resolved, however, is the issue of what is an "enterprise"
within the meaning of the statute. Does an enterprise have to be a legitimate
business or can it be a criminal organization? There is a split of authority
on this matter. At least six circuits have specifically addressed this issue
in RICO cases. Five circuits include illegitimate enterprises within the
coverage of the statute."8 Only the Sixth Circuit requires the enterprise
to be legitimate."
42 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
'
3 Id. at 303.
4' Under RICO, an individual acting alone could be convicted if his actions gained an interest
in or control of some enterprise. That enterprise may have no role whatsoever in the
commission of the underlying crime. Hence, an individual may murder in order to gain
control of a business and be prosecuted, in some circumstances, under RICO..
45 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
48 Second Circuit: United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1312 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2nd Cir. 1974) (exempting
illegal enterprises would leave a loophole), cert. denied sub. nom. Napoli v. United States
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976).
Third Circuit: Vignola v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd
mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); Manchester
v. United States, No. 79-656 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd mere. 605 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1344 (1980), summarized at 26 CraM. L. REP. 4241 (1980);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978).
Fifth Circuit: United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978) (it would deny
society the protection Congress intended if court held that the Act does not reach illegal
enterprises), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. McLauren, 557 F.2d 1064
(5th Cir. 1977) (enterprise includes a prostitution ring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978);
United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (enterprise includes police taking
[Vol. 14:1
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The Second Circuit in United States v. Huber,"8 found that a group of
corporations can be an enterprise within the meaning of the Act. The court
felt that to exclude groups of corporations would be an overly rigid reading
of the definition included in section 1961.' It found that the list of examples
included in the definitions was not exhaustive, but merely illustrative." Where
the enterprise involved is commercial in nature, courts have consistently con-
strued "enterprise" broadly in light of the congressional mandate that
Title IX of the Act "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose."'" The Huber court went on to say:
Congress was concerned about the impact on the American economy
of the infiltration of organized crime into interstate commerce. There
is no reason to believe that Congress cared what form such infiltration
took, except to indicate by an abundance of caution in listing the ex-
amples in the definition of enterprise that all such harmful infiltration,
regardless of form, should be eradicated. To view "enterprise" as ex-
cluding groups of corporations would make it too easy to avoid RICO's
forfeiture sanction. One could simply transfer assets from the corpo-
ration whose affairs had been conducted through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity to another corporation whose affairs had up to that point
not been so conducted. We agree with the government that appellant's
reading of the statute would perversely insulate the most sophisticated
racketeering combinations from RICO's sanctions, the precise opposite
of Congress' intentions."
bribes), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.
1976) (gambling); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976) (gambling).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (wagering business), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975).
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979) (combination to
commit murder and extortion), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
47 United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
48 603 F.2d 387.
49 ld. at 393.
6o Id. at 394.
51 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
52 Id. It is interesting that Huber did not involve the infiltration of business enterprises by
"organized crime figures." Appellant was a graduate of Princeton University and Harvard Law
School and a member of the New Jersey Bar. He went to work with his father in a hos-
pital supply business which had a number of cost-plus contracts with hospitals in New
York and New Jersey. Appellant and his father acquired the business and directed em-
ployees to inflate the manufacturers' costs quoted to the hospitals. Invoices were falsified
where necessary; hospitals were charged for freight costs not incurred. As a result the
business received an 18-25% markup rather than the 5-8% specified in the contracts. The
racketeering prosecution was under 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The underlying acts were defrauding
the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, false statements to the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, using-the mails to defraud in viola-
Summer, 19801
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In United States v. Parness5 the court found that acquisition of a
foreign corporation through a pattern of racketeering was prohibited by
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). The fact that the acquired business was foreign
did not exclude it from the definition of "enterprise":
Section 1962(b) proscribes the acquisition of "any interest in
or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." "Enterprise" is de,-
fined in § 1961(4) to include "any . .. corporation." On its face
the proscription is all inclusive. It permits no inference that the Act
was intended to have a parochial application. The legislative history,
moreover, strongly indicates the intent of Congress that this provision
be broadly construed ...
We find Parness' claim unpersuasive for yet another reason. It
presupposes that in enacting § 1962(b) Congress intended to focus
exclusively upon the enterprise acquired and sought to protect only
American institutions. There is no indication that the statute was
meant to have such a limited remedial scope. On the contrary, its
legislative history leaves no room for doubt that Congress intended
to deal generally with the influences of organized crime on the Ameri-
can economy and not merely with its infiltration into domestic en-
terprises.'
The Second Circuit found that limiting the Act to the infiltration of
legitimate domestic businesses would permit "those who ravage the Ameri-
can economy to escape prosecution simply by investing the proceeds of
their ill-gotten gains in a foreign enterprise."5 Parness had tried to do just
that. He had gained control of the St. Maarten Isle Hotel Corporation (which
owned an insolvent and partially completed hotel-casino complex on the
island of St. Maarten in the Netherlands Antilles) by withholding funds
due the corporation, loaning the funds due the corporation to a third
party and thereafter preventing the third party from repaying the loans
by continually concealing gambling "marker" collections and denying
him access to funds remitted.5
In United States v. Altese, 7 the Second Circuit held that Act applies
not only to a legitimate business enterprise conducted through a pattern
of racketeering activity, but also to an illegal gambling business. Judge
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and making false statements before a grand jury in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1623. Although the court discussed infiltration of legitimate business as the basis
of its holding that this was an enterprise, use of that theory was probably not necessary under
these facts.
53 503 F.2d 430.
4 ld. at 439.
85 Id.
8e Id. at 433-35.
57 542 F.2d 104.
[Vol. 14:1I
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Van Graafeiland wrote a lengthy dissent asserting that "enterprise" was
intended by Congress to encompass only legitimate businesses or organiza-
tions." He was of the opinion that well established doctrine warned against
expansively interpreting broad language which immediately follows narrow
and specific terms. Combined with the traditional rule resolving ambiguities
in penal statutes in favor of lenity,"9 the judge felt that there was significant
doubt as to the scope of section 1962. "Notwithstanding the mandate of
Congress to liberally construe the provisions of Title IX . . . 'when choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress made a
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.' "SO
Judge Van Graafeiland felt that a review of the legislative history left
"no doubt that Congress never contemplated that 'enterprise' as used in
sections 1961 and 1962 would extend beyond legitimate businesses or or-
ganizations."'" The judge felt that there was nothing in the floor debates
to indicate that any member of Congress expected or desired the far reaching
interpretation postulated by the majority. He cited United States v. Moeller,"
United States v. Frumento6 ' and United States v. Mandel" to support his
position. Frumento and Mandel do not seem on point, however, since they
deal with the issue of whether a state agency could be an "enterprise." Both
courts held in the affirmative. In Moeller, however, District Judge Newman
specifically rejected the holding of the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Cappetto,6" and found that section 1962(c) did not include unlawful
ventures. The district judge felt that whatever ambiguity existed as to
whether "enterprise" should be construed to include unlawful organizations
had to be resolved against such a broad construction. Moeller would have
to be considered to have been overruled by United States v. Altese regardless
of the persuasiveness of its reasoning.
The Third Circuit, in Vignola v. United States," found that the Phila-
delphia traffic court, of which the appellant was the presiding judge, con-
stituted an enterprise within the meaning of RICO, that the activities of
the traffic court affected interstate commerce and that it was unnecessary
"Id. at 107 (Van Graafeiland, dissenting).
5 9 1d. (citing United States v. Campas Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971); Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir.
1973)).
60 542 F.2d at 107 n.1.
61 Id. at 108.
62 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
63 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
64 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
65 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
c6464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1979).
Summer, .19801
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to prove that the bribery involved needed to affect interstate commerce. In
Manchester v. United States,6 it found that a complex scheme involving
knowing and intelligent payment of a bribe to a state agency employee was
covered by RICO.
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Elliott,8 found that an organization
existing for the purposes of arson, stealing automobiles, counterfeiting auto-
mobile titles, stealing meat and intimidating witnesses was an enterprise
within the meaning of RICO.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Aleman,6" found that the con-
duct of two defendants who committed three home burglaries fell within
the reach of RICO. The defendants' claim that RICO reaches only ac-
tivities which constitute infiltration by organized crime of legitimate busi-
nesses was rejected in view of the facts that RICO applies to "any person"
and "any enterprise" and racketeering activity as defined in the Act includes
the state crime of robbery. In United States v. Grzywacz,0 the court held
that a municipal police department could be an enterprise within the meaning
of RICO. The defendants, all former police officers, were convicted of using
their positions to solicit and accept bribes and sexual favors from business
establishments for acquiescence in and protection of prostitution and after-
hours violations.
The Sixth Circuit, however, held that the Act cannot be applied to
persons engaged in racketeering activity unrelated to any legitimate ac-
tivity."1 According to the Sixth Circuit, the Act's central aim is "to prevent
and punish the financial infiltration and corrupt operation, through patterns
of activity, of legitimate business operations affecting interstate commerce." 11
Appellants operated a drug dealing "enterprise" through a pattern of racket-
eering and conspiracy. It was the government's theory that these were not
isolated criminal ventures but simply separate departments of a unitary
criminal enterprise under the management and control of two of the ap-
pellants.
The appellants' main contention was that the Act was intended to pro-
hibit only the infiltration and operation of legitimate enterprises through
patterns of racketeering. They argued that the statute did not reach a group
who merely committed a series of racketeering activities. The court found
that the legislative history conclusively demonstrated that the Act was
0T No. 79-656 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afl'd, 605 F.2d 1198, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1344. See
summary of the case at 26 CRlM. L. REP. 4241 (BNA).
68571 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
69 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
70 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979).
71 United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260.
72 Id. at 263.
[Vol. 14:1
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passed "in response to the growing subversion of our society's legitimate
institutions of business and labor by organized crime, a relatively recent
development that Congress deemed a significantly more dangerous threat
to the nation's social and economic stability than the age-old problem of
crime for crime's sake.""3
The Act's evident purpose was to single out racketeering activity under-
taken in connection with the subversion of legitimate institutions as
a special case deserving of even harsher penal sanctions. . . .Under
[this view] the appellants [were] not so much attempting to slip
through a 'loophole' in the law as they [were] quite properly pointing
out that they did not engage in the aggravated form of racketeering
for which RICO was exclusively designed."
The Sixth Circuit held that an "'enterprise', within the meaning of
the statute, was 'any individual, partnership, corporation, association . ..
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact' that is organized
and acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared
or informally recognized." 5 At least one commentator has concluded that
the Sixth Circuit's decision was incorrect."' Clearly, the prevailing weight
of authority indicates that the case was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court
has denied petitions for certiorari in cases involving prosecutions under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) where the enterprise affecting interstate commerce
in which the defendants participated was a wagering business,77 an auto-
mobile theft business,"' a burglary business, 9 an insurance fraud business"
and a prostitution business.81 While a denial of a petition for certiorari has
no precedential value,82 it cannot be ignored that the Supreme Court has
been presented with cases wherein the circuit court has declared that un-
lawful organizations are within the scope of section 1962 and taken no
steps to change those circuit court holdings. I would not expect the Supreme
Court, as presently constituted, to overrule the Second, Third, Fifth, Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits on this matter even if it decided to accept a
case for decision. At it stands currently, operations organized for illegal
purposes only are considered within the coverage of RICO in five circuits
and outside the coverage in one circuit. Five circuits have yet to speak.
,s ld. at 268.
t id.
TO Id. at 270.
1e Blakely, supra note 38, at 354.
IT United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351; United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436.
TO United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 104.
7 United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298.
90 United States v. Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Wis. 1976), ard, 583 F.2d 325 (7th,
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
81 United States v. McLauren, 557 F.2d 1064.
82 The denial may rest upon considerations other than the merits of the particular issue.
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ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
It is insufficient simply to show that a defendant committed two or
more of the predicate acts outlined as "racketeering activity" in section
1961(1). The defendant must also be involved in some way with an
enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce.8 3 In order to
successfully prosecute under section 1962(a), the government must show
that: (1) the defendant received income from two acts of racketeering
activity which occurred within ten years of each other; (2) the defendant
participated as a principal in those acts of racketeering" ' in order to use
or invest the income or proceeds thereof in either (a) the acquisition of
any interest in or (b) the establishment or operation of, any enterprise; and,
(3) the enterprise is engaged in, or the activities of the enterprise affect,
interstate commerce. Section 1962(a) is designed to prevent the investment
of "dirty money" into an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Since
persons usually do not "buy" their way into a criminal enterprise, section
1962(a) is directed at the investment of funds in legitimate enterprises.85
In order to successfully prosecute under section 1962(b) the gov-
ernment must show: (1) that the defendant engaged in two or more
racketeering activities within ten years of one another or that he collected
an unlawful debt; (2) that the defendant acquired or maintained an in-
terest or control in an enterprise by means of those racketeering activities;
and, (3) that the enterprise was engaged in or the activities of the enter-
prise affected interstate commerce. Section 1962(b) is designed to pro-
hibit the takeover of an enterprise, not by infusion of cash as in section
1962(a), but rather by some unlawful activity. The primary situation to
which section 1962(b) would apply would be loan sharking. Here a busi-
ness owner becomes indebted to the defendant, is unable to pay, and turns
over a portion of his business to the defendant in payment of the debt. A
second situation where section 1962(b) would apply is straight extortion.
Again, an interest in the victim's business would be turned over to the de-
fendant. As in the section 1962(a) cases, the enterprise will usually be
a legitimate business. A pimp who fends off an attempt by a second pimp
to take over part of his business by murdering that second pimp, however,
probably could be prosecuted under section 1962(b). Naturally, the gov-
ernment would have to show the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity."
In order to successfully prosecute under section 1962(c) the gov-
ernment must show: (1) that the defendant was employed by or associated
- 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
84 But see, Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491, 1495-98 (1974).
85 An alleged boss of a so-called "mafia" family is reputed to have "bought" his way into
the family many years ago by laundering a large sum of "hot" currency. If so, this trans-
action is of the type that could arguably bc prosecuted under § 1962(a).
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with an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise was engaged in or the activities
of the enterprise affected interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant
conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise; and, (4) that the
defendant participated in the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt. Section 1962(c) is
the section which is most likely to involve an unlawful enterprise. This
is also the section which is most likely to generate prosecutions which were
probably not contemplated by the legislature. Under this section a relatively
uncomplicated undertaking by two persons not normally considered "organ-
ized crime figures" can run afoul of RICO.
A group of corporations can be an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO.8" However, they must not be merely unrelated businesses owned
coincidentally by the defendant. They must all be involved in the underlying
criminal acts, and they must be fairly characterized as a single business8?
The statute requires that the activities of the enterprise, "not each predicate
act of racketeering," have an effect upon interstate commerce.88 The
statute refers to "any activity engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce." 9 The government must show a nexus
between the enterprise and interstate or foreign commerce, albeit minimal,
to satisfy the requirement. 90
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
"Title IX's criminal forfeiture provision and its civil remedies--es-
pecially divestiture and dissolution-are directed towards reducing the power
of those people in organized crime through restraint of their economic ac-
tivity."91 The forfeiture provision provides a means of separating the con-
victed racketeer from the enterprise. While the scope of the forfeiture is
very broad, it is not limitless:
Congress' decision to reinstitute in personam forfeitures was a drastic
step, and its power to do so was not free from doubt. RICO's pro-
ponents, including the Department of Justice, took pains to point out
that the statute's provisions revived forfeiture of estate in a limited
way. The convicted racketeer would not lose all of his property,
and certainly not the right to own property. He would lose only his
ssUnited States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387.
8T Id.
8 8 United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564; United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852-54.
89 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
90Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564;
United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hobbs Act violation), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976), rehearing denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
91 Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies
for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. RPv. 192, 196 (1975).
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interest in the business he corrupted in violation of RICO's sub-
stantive provisions. Although forfeiture was understood to be punitive,
it did not portend massive losses so out of proportion to the criminal
conduct that due process or eighth amendment guarantees would be
compromised."2 [footnotes omitted]
There is some doubt as to the scope of forfeiture authorized under
section 1963(a). One commentator has reached the conclusion that the
legislative history provides compelling evidence that Congress intended for-
feiture of only a narrow category of interests, the proprietary or ownership
rights of a defendant in a RICO enterprise."3 He may be correct as to his
conclusion, but the answer is not necessarily provided in the legislative
history. The history is silent on that specific issue, and read in its entirety
could lead to a conclusion which would indicate that all profits accrued
by the racketeer through a pattern of racketeering should also be forfeited.
Senator John L. McClellan (D. Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee at the time the Act was passed, has written:
Title IX attacks the problem [of removing organized crime from our
legitimate organizations] by providing a means of wholesale removal
of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return,
and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains.... Title IX,
drawing on this early history, [of the common law of criminal for-
feiture] would forfeit the ill-gotten gains of criminals where they enter
or operate an organization through a pattern of racketeering activity."'
Senator McClellan's words suggest that the language of section 1963(a)
(1), "any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962,"
includes more than only interests in an enterprise as provided in section 1963
(a) (2). Although the Senator stated that the purpose of his article was
to "set the record straight concerning the implications of S.30,"" he did
not help us out on this question. At best, the situation is well clouded in
the legislative history.
Earlier this year the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took up this question
in United States v. Marubeni America Corporation." Marubeni America
Corporation (Marubeni), an American Corporation and Hitachi Cable, Ltd.
(Hitachi), a Japanese Corporation, were engaged in the production and
sale of electrical cable. The government contended that Marubeni's local
representative in Alaska had paid bribes to an official of Anchorage Tele-
2 Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM.
Cam. L. REv. 379, 380 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Taylor, Forfeiture).
93 Id.
94 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liber-
ties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970).
95 Id. at 55.
"611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
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phone Utility (ATU) for confidential bidding information on some supply
contracts. Marubeni and Hitachi used the information to underbid their
competitors. Based on their bids, Marubeni and Hitachi were awarded
large parts of these supply contracts. The government sought forfeiture of the
amounts paid or payable to Marubeni and Hitachi on the contracts. The
government insisted that the term "interest" means any form of income
or proceeds from a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the government's position. The
court noted that when Congress meant "income" in the Act, it used that
term. The implication was that the term "interest" as it was used in section
1963 (a) (1 )'s forfeiture provision meant something other than income de-
rived from a pattern of racketeering activity. 7 The Ninth Circuit found
the government's argument, that Congress must have sought to attack
the potential for infiltration by depriving criminals of the ill-gotten gains
they used to acquire interests in legitimate businesses, attractive, but could not
reconcile this position with the language of the statute.
The court looked to the provisions of section 1962(a) which allow
for the investment of "dirty money" into legitimate businesses by racketeers
so long as they do so for investment, without intending to control
the issues, and their total holdings do not exceed one percent of the out-
standing securities of any one class. The court concluded that the gov-
ernment's position "defeat[ed] the 1 percent investment exception and made
the rest of § 1962(a) surplusage because, under it, § 1962(c) would re-
quire forfeiture regardless of how racketeering income was invested."98 The
court was of the opinion that Congress plainly imposed criminal forfeiture
to separate racketeers from the enterprises they owned, controlled or oper-
ated and not to attack racketeering broadsides:
We believe anyone who reads the legislative history must be struck
by the singlemindedness with which Congress drafted RICO. Congress
declared over and over again that its purpose was to rid legitimate
organizations of the influence of organized crime. This purpose must
be the linchpin of any construction of RICO. The government loses
sight of this when it argues that a "loophole" would be created if
racketeers were allowed to divest themselves of interests in an enterprise
and thereby avoid forfeiture. Divestiture is not exploitation of a "loop-
hole." It is the action that Congress intended to induce.9'
The court's decision is questionable since it is based upon a false
premise. As stated earlier, the scope of the forfeiture provision is not clearly
established by the legislative history. The court, however, felt that the
9*7 d. at 766.
8 d. at 767.
99Id. at 767 n. l.
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legislative history was clear on this matter. This enabled the court to give
undue weight to the argument that the government's position would render
the one percent investment exception of 1962(a) mere surplusage in light
of section 1962(c).
Section 1962(c) relates to the operation of an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962
(a) prohibits the investment of monies gained from a pattern of racketeering
into an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Under the total forfeiture
theory, the one percent investment exception is rendered useless only if the
pattern of racketeering activity which generated the investment also related
to the conducting of, or the participation in the affairs of, an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce. If the defendant raised money through a
pattern of racketeering unrelated to any participation in an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce, however, he would retain the benefit of the
one percent exception. For example, if a defendant, acting completely alone,
robs two state licensed banks on succeeding Mondays, never crosses a
state line nor engages in any conspiracy with any other party, he has en-
gaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as outlined in section 1961(5).
However, he has not yet violated any provision of section 1962. Section
1962(c) requires the operation of an enterprise. There clearly was no enter-
prise. Section 1962(b) requires the acquisition or maintenance of an in-
terest in an enterprise. Again, there is no enterprise over which he has
gained or maintained any interest or influence. Section 1962(a) requires
the investment of funds. The defendant has not yet invested any of the pro-
ceeds from the bank robbery. Clearly, he did not gain any interest in the
banks because of the robberies. Accordingly, he has not violated RICO.
The defendant then takes the proceeds of the bank robberies and
makes two investments. With a portion of the funds he buys, on the open
market, IBM stock, in an amount less than one percent of any outstanding
class. Obviously, he could have no reasonable expectation of controlling
IBM or electing a director. With the remaining money he invests in a gam-
bling casino on the California-Nevada border. The lodge is an enterprise
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. By virtue of his investment
in the casino, the defendant has violated section 1962(a). He still
has not violated section 1962(c). Upon prosecution, he could be ordered
to forfeit his interest in the casino but not his stock in IBM. He
is still entitled to the one percent investment exception of section 1962(a).
Accordingly, section 1962(c) does not render that exception mere surplus-
age. There are instances, however, where that exception will not be available
to the racketeer under the general forfeiture theory. If an individual operates
an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering and then invests
the proceeds of that activity in stock of a third enterprise, he will not be
allowed to rely upon the exception. In that case the money is forfeited
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under section 1962(c). Accordingly, the court's central premise in Maru-
beni is incorrect.
Further, the court's interpretation renders section 1963(a) (1) mere
surplusage. Section 1963(a) (1) requires a forfeiture of any interest ac-
quired or maintained in violation of section 1962. Section 1963(a)(2)
requires the forfeiture of "any interest in . . . any enterprise which he
[the defendant] has established, operated, controlled, conducted or par-
ticipated in the conduct of, in violation of § 1962." If this requirement
is added to section 1963(a)(1) by implication, as suggested by the
Ninth Circuit, it renders section 1963(a)(1) meaningless. Anything for-
feitable under section 1963(a) (1) would also be forfeitable under section
1963 (a) (2). Such a result is untenable.
Additionally, there is no ambiguity in the language of section 1963(a).
The language involving control or influence over an enterprise is found only
in clause (2) of section 1963(a). It does not appear anywhere in section
1963 (a) (1). The two clauses are grammatically distinct. Clause (1) is com-
pletely contained in that section prior to the comma and subclause identifier
[(2)]. In no way could it be reasonably argued that some of the language
subsequent to the clause (2) designation modifies the preceding clause.
If Congress wanted to include the language involving control of an enter-
prise as part of clause (1) it would have done so. The failure to include
that language must be interpreted as a clear statement that it is not ap-
plicable. Resorting to the legislative history is inappropriate in this instance.
A review of the legislative history is appropriate to resolve an ambiguity
on the face of the statute. There is no ambiguity on the face of this statute.
Its language is clear; the legislative history cannot be relied upon to reach
a result opposite from the plain meaning of the words.
In United States v. Thevis °° the district court, relying upon Maru-
beni,'0 ' also concluded that the interest forfeitable under section 1963 (a) is
limited to an interest in an enterprise and does not extend to fruits and
profits generated from the enterprise. For the reasons stated above, Thevis
was also decided incorrectly. Under the theory developed in Marubeni
and Thevis, if an organized crime organization, through a pattern of racket-
eering, secured a loan from a union pension plan, the proceeds of that
loan would not be forfeitable unless they were invested in an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce in order to influence that enterprise. Congress
could not possibly have intended such a result.
Forfeitable rights apparently include elected offices in labor unions.
In two cases, courts have ordered defendants to forfeit their presidential
100474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.Ga. 1979).
101 United States v. Marubeni America Corp., No. 78-1060 (D.Cal. March 30, 1979).
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offices in labor unions where the defendants were found to have conducted
the union through a pattern of racketeering activity."0 2 In neither case did
the court order perpetual forfeiture of the defendant's right to be re-elected
to the office. The statute's limited reach permits forfeiture only of currently
held rights.' In United States v. Rubin'" the Fifth Circuit found that the
appellant, who had been found guilty of embezzlement of union and em-
ployee welfare benefit plan funds, racketeering, false statements on income
tax returns and failure to keep labor union records, could be ordered to
forfeit his union office. The court further stated:
The forfeiture sanction, however, can have no proper effect upon
appellant's right in the future to seek union office, including the offices
he must now give up. That right to run for and hold office is not
something appellant as an individual has acquired or maintained with
respect to the various union entities; it is the same right possessed by
all members of all unions. In no sense a contractual or property right
held by the individual against a union, the right to seek union office
is rather guaranteed by federal statute. See 29 U.S.C. 481 (e). The
language of the new penal statute does not extend to such a right."0 5
There are a number of cases now pending which will hopefully add
some light to this question. In Massachusetts, there is an extended in-
vestigation being conducted by the Special Commission Concerning State and
County Buildings into a pattern of bribery of state officials by an archi-
tectural firm for the purpose of securing state contracts. The United States
Attorney has indicated an interest in prosecuting under RICO.
In the Northern District of California, a number of members of the
"Hell's Angels" motorcycle gang were convicted on RICO charges. The
government contended that the "Hell's Angels" were subject to prose-
cution under RICO because club bylaws required members to sell drugs
and protect the traffic by committing murders and assault and by bribing
law enforcement officials." 8
In New York, the president of the Newspaper Deliverers Union is
charged with racketeering and extortion, partly in connection with a 1978
newspaper strike in New York. The 136 count indictment accuses the de-
fendant of receiving unlawful payoffs from seven wholesale newspaper de-
livery companies from 1976 to 1979." ' In Philadelphia, a Teamster Union
- United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 133
(1979); United States v. Barone, No. 78-185 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 1979); Taylor, Forfeiture,
supra note 92.
203 Id.
104 559 F.2d 975.
L05 Id. at 992-93.
106 Washington Post, Aug. 19, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 4.
107 Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 4.
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leader was recently acquitted of racketeering charges which alleged murder,
arson and embezzlement.08
Also in Philadelphia, racketeering charges may soon arise out of
the gangland style murder of a reputed organized crime leader who was
allegedly murdered over a dispute concerning control of a gambling busi-
ness in Atlantic City, New Jersey."'9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently declared that the
word "shall" in the forfeiture statute is used in the mandatory sense. Ac-
cordingly, a district court has no discretion to refuse to order forfeiture
of a convicted defendant's tainted property interest. The language of the
statute itself was meant to be mandatory."1
FORFEITURES RELATED TO LABOR UNIONS
There are primarily two ways in which all of the foregoing relate to
labor unions. First, and most likely, a defendant might acquire or maintain
an interest in or control of a labor union through a pattern of racketeering
activity. Secondly, a labor union itself might conduct its affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity. The question arises as to whether assets
of the labor union may be forfeited as a result of these violations of section
1962.
It seems well settled that if a defendant acquires or maintains control
over a labor union through a pattern of racketeering activity, the only
thing subject to forfeiture is the defendant's position in the labor union. 1'
It would be most unlikely for an individual to invest racketeering funds
into a labor union in violation of section 1962(a). Usually the vice com-
plained of is the defendant's looting of the union treasury, not his building
it up. An interesting question arises if an employee of a labor union should
engage in the conduct of that labor union through a pattern of racketeering
activity, not chargeable to the union itself, and as a result thereof acquires
an interest in something. Under the Marubeni/Thevis theory, unless that
interest was in an enterprise, no forfeiture would be allowed. Accordingly,
if a union official engages in the extortion of a trucking company, the
money extorted would not be forfeitable. This is contrary to the con-
gressional intent. Under a general forfeiture theory, the proceeds of the
extortion would be forfeitable. Under either theory, if the defendant then
took funds and bought stock in a Las Vegas casino, that stock would be
forfeited. However, the underlying violation would be of section 1962(a),
10- Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 4.
109 Washington Post, March 29, 1980, § A, at 10, col. 6.
210 United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980).
1
.2 See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975; United States v. Barone, No. 18-185 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 17, 1979).
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not section 1962(c). As a practical matter then, the union cannot be "shut
down" under RICO because of racketeering activity of third parties which
allow those parties to gain control of a union local.
What about the situation where the union itself engages in a pattern
of racketeering activity? As an inanimate object, created by statute, the
labor union can operate only through third party officers, agents and em-
ployees. Not all actions of a labor union officer or agent are chargeable
to the union itself. Thus, if the president of a union local, acting for
his own personal profit, extorts money from a trucking firm, the labor union
should share no civil or criminal responsibility for his acts. Only those
actions taken by an authorized agent, acting pursuant to apparent union
authorization and in the furtherance of union affairs, are deemed to be
actions of the union itself. Naturally, a union can ratify actions taken by
one who does not meet the above criteria at the time of the action.
If a union local determines, through deliberations of its manage-
ment, to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity which allows it to
gain control of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, and does so for
the benefit of the union and its membership, then that union has violated
section 1962 and is liable under section 1963(a). For instance, assume
the existence of a union local in New York which is governed by a
president, vice president, secretary-treasurer and a seven-member executive
board. At a meeting of the executive board, all ten persons vote to gain control
of a trucking company in Philadelphia. The trucking company in Phila-
delphia employs people who live in Pennsylvania, Delaware and New
Jersey. The company serves businesses located in those same three states.
The union intends, through use of murder, bribery, extortion and theft
from interstate shipments, to gain a majority of the company's director posi-
tions for union stooges for the express purpose of negotiating a contract
calling for payments to the union pension plan to the credit of employees
who do not exist. The union specifically intends to loot the company bank
accounts and then declare bankruptcy. The pension fund then takes the
money contributed under the new bargaining agreement and builds a
gambling casino on the California-Nevada border. The trustees of the pen-
sion plan are the officers and members of the executive board of the union.
The union itself through its authorized agents, has violated sections
1962(c) and 1962(b) and by investing in the gambling casino, section
1962(a). However, all of the benefit of the activity runs to the general
membership of the union, none of whom had anything to do with the
racketeering activity. To forfeit the union's interest in the gambling casino
would work to the distinct financial disadvantage of the union membership.
Under the Marubeni/Thevis theory, only the union's interest in the
gambling casino would be forfeited. Although the pension plan is an enter-
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prise affecting interstate commerce, the pattern of racketeering did not allow
anyone to gain or maintain an interest in the pension plan. Accordingly,
those funds not resulting in the acquisition of an interest in some enterprise
are not forfeited. Money deposited in commercial banks would remain
there. Funds in mutual banks and credit unions may be subject to for-
feiture, since the amount of deposits represent management shares in the
institution.
Under a general forfeiture theory, all of the payments by the company
to the union which result from the racketeering activity could be forfeited.
There is the obvious public policy question, however, of whether any of
the funds should be forfeited. The officers and agents of the union hold a
fiduciary duty towards the members." 2 The beneficial owners of the money
which was extorted are the members of the union at large. None of the
beneficial owners engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. To forfeit
the interest in the Las Vegas casino may well bankrupt the pension plan
and cause financial hardship to innocent union members. As a matter of
public policy, should such a result be allowed?
Naturally, there is not yet any answer to this question. Under the
existing law, as represented by Marubeni and Thevis, the union's holdings
in the casino could be forfeited under RICO. To hold otherwise would
encourage union officers to engage in illegal acts to further union interests and
allow union members to close their eyes to the officers' tactics so as to
avoid an implied ratification by non-action. Under a corporate responsi-
bility theory, the business organization, here a labor union, would be re-
sponsible for the acts of its agents done with apparent authority and in
furtherance of corporate interests. As a result of that activity and the re-
sulting sanctions, the innocent partners, the stockholders, would suffer a
loss in market value of their investment regardless of the fact that they
did not engage in any wrongdoing. Arguably, the same result should be
reached here."'
The interests of the union members, however, may be more intense
than that of stockholders. The individual union member may be in a posi-
tion where his pension, for which he has worked and contributed for decades,
is wiped out by an action of the United States Government. Either alter-
native is unacceptable. Congress should act to fill the gap and ensure that
racketeering activity by union officers and agents is economically disad.
vantageous. It must also act to insure that the individual members' interests
are adequately protected.
-2i 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
TU3 But see United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 19 L.R.R.M. 2406, 2410
(1947).
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